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examination was conducted by the board's impartial panel of chest examiners.
Subsequently, at hearings in 1956, the doctor relied on in the 1944 proceedings
admitted that his 1944 diagnosis had been wrong and that he was now con-
vinced that claimant had been totally disabled at that time. (The doctor's
1954 opinion was based upon a re-examination of 1944 X-rays and other
records.) At the 1956 hearing, the Board awarded claimant compensation
based upon the finding that there had been total disability as a result of
silicosis in 1944.
The Appellate Division unanimously reversed and dismissed the claim,
basing its decision on Section 123.36
The Court of Appeals in a 4-3 decision, reversed and held that in reopen-
ing the case in 1954 the Board was merely reconsidering its previous denial
of an application for rehearing made less than seven years after the accident. 87
The precedent relied on by the Court was Roder v. Northern Maytag Co.38
In Roder the claim was first disallowed by the Board on the ground that
claimant had failed to establish a causal connection. A month before Section
123's seven year period expired, an application to reopen the case was made,
and this was denied just after the expiration of that period. One week later,
a motion for reconsideration or reargument was made, and the Board rescinded
its denial of the previous week and noted that it was reconsidering the previous
application for rehearing which had been filed within the seven year period.
The Court of Appeals affirmed this determination.
In Stimburis, the majority indicated that its decision necessarily follows
from Roder. However, the dissent per Judge Fuld, considered the resemblance
between the two cases to be only superficial. In Roder, the second application
for a rehearing was filed just one week after the board's denial of the previous
application, while in Stimburis the second application was made ten years
after the first.
The Stimburis decision writes even more of an exception into Section 123
than Roder did, and it would seem that the dissent's fear of Stimburis con-
struing the section out of existence is justified. The Board is given the power
to reopen a claim at any time, provided only that the initial request to reopen
was made some-time within the seven year period. This could be used to cir-
cumvent the finality policy adopted by the legislature.
PREREQUISITES TO INDEMNITY UNDER LONGSHOREMEN'S AND HARBOR WORK-
ERS' COMPENSATION ACT
The statutory immunity given by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Work-
ers' Compensation Act to an employer from common law tort liability to an
employee, and the "right-over" against an employee's recovery from a negli-
36. 5 A.D.2d 209, 171 N.Y.S.2d 153 (3d Dep't 1958).
37. N.Y. WoamEMN's Coiip. LAW § 38 provides that the disablement of an employee
resulting from an occupational disease shall be treated as the happening of an accident.
38. 297 N.Y. 196, 78 N.E.2d 470 (1948).
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gent third party,3 9 create an unjust situation in instances where the employer
and a third party would be joint-tortfeasors at common law. Common law
contribution of indemnification between joint-tortfeasors is based upon the
parties being jointly liable to the injured party. The Longshoremen's Act
specifically provides that the employer is not liable to his employee in tort.
As a result of this factor, the third party could be denied either contribution
or indemnification. To make the situation even more unjust, the employer's
"right-over" allows him to be made whole as to any liability imposed under
the act where a recovery is had against a third party.4°
Both the New York and the Federal courts have recognized the injustice
of this situation and have attempted to take the sting out of the immunity
granted to the employer, whenever possible. However, since the employer is
immune from any other liability "on account" of the injuries to an employee,
the courts have had to procede on theories other than tort in order to impose
this additional liability.41
The New York courts in interpreting the analogous New York Workmen's
Compensation Law have relied upon a theory of quasi-contract or implied-
contract. This is to say, that where an employee has been injured as a result
of the active or primary negligence of his employer and the secondary or
passive negligence of a third party, the employer would be unjustly enriched
if he were allowed immunity from common law liability at the expense of the
third party.42 In Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Es-
tates Corp.,43 arising under the New York Workmen's Compensation Act, the
Court found an implied-contract of imdennification to protect the "innocent"
third party. This "contract" was implied in law on the basis of equitable
principles designed to prevent unjust enrichment.
In McFall v. Campagnie Maritime Belge,44 the New York Court of
Appeals, exercising its concurrent jurisidiction under the Longshoremen's Act,
had an opportunity to decide a case factually similar to the Westchester case,
arising under the Federal statute. The New York Court applied the quasi-
39. Section 1, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1952). Sec-
tion 905 provides: "The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this title shall
be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer, . . .on account of such
injuries or death . . . ." Section 933 provides: "that an injured employee may elect to
receive compensation from his employer or to recover damages against some person,
other than the employer, who is liable to the employee in damages." Section 933(b) provides:
"Acceptance of such compensation under an award in a compensation order ... shall
operate as an assignment to the employer of all rights of such person entitled to com-
pensation to recover damages against such third person."
40. For a complete discussion of this problem see Weinstock, The Employer's Duty
to Indemnify Shipowners for Damages Recovered by Harbor Workers, 103 u. PA. L. -XV.
321 (1954).
41. See Slatter v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 139, (2d Cir. 1950).
42. N.Y. WORMaUE'S CoMs. LAw § 11 provides: "The liability of an employer pre-
scribed by the last preceding section shall be exclusive and in place of any other liability
whatsoever, . . . on account of such injury or death .... " cf. LoNGsxoaM 's AND HAR-
BOR WoRXER's CoirPENsAnoN Acsr, § 933, supra note 39.
43. 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567 (1938).
44. 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463 (1952).
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contract theory and held that a shipowner had a "contractual" right to in-
demnity arising by operation of law where the shipowner was held liable to
an injured workman, provided that the shipowner's negligence was only
secondary or passive while the employer's negligence was the primary or active
cause of the employee's injury. This was the first time that the implied-
contract theory was used to impose liability on an employer covered by the
Longshoremen's Act.
This past term, Merriweather v. Boland & Cornelius,45 allowed the New
York Court of Appeals to reexamine the implied-contract theory of McFall,
and its application under the Federal Statute in light of Federal decisions
rendered subsequent to the decision in McFall.
In Merriweather, the Appellate Division had dismissed the shipowner's
third party complaint on the ground that the complaint charged that the em-
ployer and shipowner were in pari delicto and thus there was no basis for in-
demnity.46 The Court of Appeals concluded that the complaint stated facts
sufficient to support recovery under either an express or implied contract, and
reversed the Appelate Division's dismissal of the complaint. Judge Froessel,
speaking for the Court proceeded to reexamine the McFall decision in the
light of three recent United States Supreme Court decisions: Ryan Stevedoring
Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S. S. Corp.,47 Weyenhauser S. S. Co. v. Nacivena Co.,48
and Crumady v. Joachime Hendrik Fisser.49
None of these decisions expressly rejected the implied-contract theory of
McFall, however, the Supreme Court restated that under the Longshoremen's
Act the employer was immune from liability arising "on account" of the
injuries to an employee, and reiterated the necessity of finding some other
basis before an employer could be held liabile to indemnify a third party.
Each of these cases involved claims of indemnity by a shipowner against an
employer whose employee was injured while performing stevedoring services
aboard ship. In each of these Supreme Court decisions the Court went to
great lengths to find an express contractual relationship existing between the
employer and the shipowner, directly or as a third party beneficiary. Having
once found some actual contractual relationship, the Court proceeded to find
express or implied terms in that contract which obligated the employer to
indemnify the shipowner.
In the Merriweather case, the Court of Appeals recognized that the
Supreme Court's requirement of an express contractual relationship was an
implied rejection of the McFall quasi-contractual theory. Since the Long-
shoremen's Act is a Federal statute it must be applied in accordance with the
Federal law. Therefore, the Court of Appeals specifically overruled its own
45. 4 N.Y.2d 417, 190 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959).
46. 7 A.D.2d 618, 179 N.Y.S.2d 678 (4th Dep't 1958).
47. 350 U.S. 124 (1955).
48. 355 U.S. 563 (1957).
49. 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
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decision in the McFall case and sustained the third party complain in
Merriweather on the sole basis of the allegation of an express contract between
the shipowner and the employer.
The decision in this case points up the necessity for parties dealing with
employers covered by the Longshoremen's Act to be certain that their transac-
tions are evidenced by a valid and enforcable contract. For the benefit of such
employers and parties dealing with them, it is desirable that such a contract
contain express terms covering the employer's duty to indemnify against
damages paid to an injured employee.
STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEM: FINALITY OF COMPTROLLER'S DETERMiNATION
OF NATURE OF ACCIDENT
Section 61 of the Retirement and Social Security Law provides that an
"accidental death benefit" shall be payable upon the death of a member of
the New York State retirement fund if the Comptroller shall determine that
he died before the effective date of his retirement "as the natural and proxi-
mate result of an accident sustained in the performance of duty." In Croshier
v. Levitt,50 the decedent, 57 years of age, had been a forest ranger for the
State Conservation Department. His death was caused by a heart attack
while fighting a forest fire. He had a history of heart trouble for which on
one previous occasion he had been hospitalized.
The decedent's widow, claiming that his death was the result of an acci-
dent, applied for the benefits allowed under Section 61. The Comptroller
rejected the claim on the ground that decedent's death was not due to an
accident. The Appellate Division annulled the Comptroller's determination, 51
and this appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals reversed in a 4-3 opinion,
holding,
the mere fact that the medical and physiological facts are not seri-
ously in dispute does not convert the ultimate issue of whether the
death was "the natural and proximate result of an accident" into a
pure question of law on which this Court has the final word.5 2
Section 74 of the above Act gives the Comptroller "exclusive authority"
in determining all applications for such a benefit.53 The problem is, what did
the Legislature mean by "exclusive authority"? Does this allow the Comp-
troller to establish a definition of accident for purposes of this Act or is he
bound by the standards used in similar fields such as Workmen's Compensa-
tion? It is significant to note, as did the majority in this case, that in Nash
v. Brooks,54 it was held that an Industrial Board determination of accidental
injury in a Workmen's Compensation proceeding was to be binding upon the
medical board of the Retirement System. The Legislature changed this result
50. 5 N.Y.2d 259, 184 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1959).
51. Croshier v. Levitt, 5 A.D.2d 941, 172 N.Y.S.2d 344 (3d Dep't 1959).
52. Croshier v. Levitt, supra note 50.
53. N.Y. RETnzEmENT MD Soc. SEc. LAW § 74.
54. 276 N.Y. 75, 11 N.E.2d 545 (1937).
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